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DAVID LEWIS (1941-2001) 
The death of David Lewis at the age of 60 has deprived philosophy of one of its most 
original and brilliant thinkers. Lewis was a systematic philosopher in a traditional 
sense, who created a system of thought (or metaphysical system) which attempts to 
reconcile the insights of modern science with pervasive elements of commonsense 
belief. Lewis was not a populariser and he had little to do with the more concrete and 
practical areas of philosophy. His work is forbiddingly abstract, and deals with many 
of the deepest and most difficult of philosophy’s traditional concerns, including the 
nature of mind, causation, necessity and being.  
His general outlook is realist, in the sense of insisting on a clear distinction 
between the world and our knowledge of it, and materialist, in the sense of 
emphasising the fundamentally physical nature of our world. In these respects, his 
work does not differ from that of many contemporary philosophers; but what is 
distinctive of Lewis’s contribution is the formidable rigour and attention to detail with 
which he pursued these metaphysical projects, and the imagination and brilliance with 
which he re-invigorated the study of metaphysics in the last few decades of the 
twentieth century. 
The originality and range of Lewis’s work is remarkable. He once wrote that 
he ‘should have liked to be a piecemeal, unsystematic philosopher, offering 
independent proposals on a variety of topics’. But, he added, ‘it was not to be.’ 
Certainly he did write on a vast range of areas – metaphysics, the theory of 
knowledge, the philosophy of language, mind and science – but his views in these 
areas were not all independent of each other. As he later put it himself, his thinking 
tended to converge on an idea he called ‘Humean supervenience’: that reality consists 
fundamentally of ‘a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing 
then another’. Everything else depends (‘supervenes’) on these ‘little things’: 
arrangements of physical qualities. Like the Enlightenment philosopher David Hume 
(hence ‘Humean’) Lewis denies that our world contains any necessity – anything that 
must be the case – other than that determined by physical law and mathematics. The 
basic idea of Humean supervenience can be illustrated by an image Lewis himself 
used: imagine a picture created out of tiny dots, which seen from a distance creates 
the impression of shapes. The shapes are completely determined by the dots, and in 
this sense they are nothing over and above the dots. In an analogous way, our world is 
completely determined by the nature of the physical qualities arranged in space and 
time.  
This somewhat austere vision of reality is supplemented in Lewis’s work by 
subtle and penetrating accounts of the everyday phenomena of language and mind 
(the ‘shapes’, so to speak). His first book, the prize-winning Convention: a 
Philosophical Study (1969), gave the most rigorous account to date of what a 
convention is, and what it means to say language is conventional. The classic 
Counterfactuals (1973) brilliantly defended a way of understanding the claims we 
make about what might have been, or what would have happened if certain other 
things had not (that is, what is contrary to fact or ‘counterfactual’). Lewis’s theory 
here appealed to what was to become the most notorious aspect of his philosophy: his 
claim that other possibilities (or ‘possible worlds’) are as real as our actual world. 
Lewis went on to defend this claim in his John Locke lectures at Oxford University, 
published as On the Plurality of Worlds (1986). He defended the real existence of 
possible worlds in the same way that a mathematician might defend the real existence 
of numbers: their existence facilitates the task of giving an adequate account of the 
nature of our world. For example, in his theory of cause and effect, arguably the most 
significant advance in this debate since Hume, he appealed to possible worlds in 
explaining what it is for an effect to depend on its cause. 
However, Lewis found few converts to his view that there are other possible 
worlds. The view met with many ‘incredulous stares’ (Lewis’s phrase) but few 
philosophers can honestly lay claim to a proper refutation of it. One of the most 
impressive aspects of his defence of the theory of possible worlds is the way in which 
Lewis follows the logic of the argument with remorseless consistency, and thus shows 
exactly how difficult it is for a consistent opponent to disagree with him. Professor 
Mark Johnston, the current chair of the Princeton Philosophy Department, has said 
that Lewis is ‘the greatest systematic metaphysician since G.W. Leibniz’. The 
comparison is apt, not only because Leibniz invented this talk of possible worlds, but 
also because Lewis shares with Leibniz a commitment to the discovery of the true and 
ultimate consequences of his ideas, even if it leads to conflict with what is apparently 
obvious. Bertrand Russell once said that the philosopher must follow the wind of the 
argument wherever it leads; Lewis followed this advice with more intellectual honesty 
than most philosophers ever do. 
Despite the abstractness of the subject-matter, Lewis was justly famed for his 
writing style, at once elegant and informal. Strange as it may seem to an outsider, his 
books and essays can be read for pleasure, for their sheer intellectual brilliance, their 
clarity and their wit. 
David Lewis was born in Oberlin, Ohio in 1941. He studied at Swarthmore 
College as undergraduate and obtained his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1967. 
His first academic appointment was at UCLA, and he taught there until moving to 
Princeton in 1970, where he remained until his death. He was a dedicated and much-
loved teacher, well-known for the care and rigorous criticism which he brought to his 
students’ work. Mark Johnston comments that he was ‘sweet and stern … always 
unfailingly generous with his time and with positive philosophical suggestions, and 
ruthless with his criticism.’ Somewhat eccentric in manner, Lewis was known among 
philosophers for his lack of small talk and his tendency to give accurate, detailed and 
literal answers to the most ordinary questions. Though somewhat disconcerting to 
new acquaintances, friends found this aspect of his behaviour part of his charm. He 
was a railway enthusiast and collected model trains; visitors to his model train layout 
sometimes observed that he had created a whole possible world in his own home. 
 Lewis and his wife Stephanie felt particularly at home in Australia, where they 
had many philosophical friends. He left there an abiding intellectual legacy, a sign of 
which is the honorary degree he received from the University of Melbourne (he also 
received honorary doctorates from the Universities of York and Cambridge). 
Unpretentious and modest in his tastes, he enjoyed the informality, straightforward 
openness and good humour of Australian society, and would often be found singing 
Australian folksongs during the annual conference of the Australasian Association of 
Philosophy. He was a keen follower of Australian Rules football, and occasionally 
used his favourite team (Essendon of Melbourne) in humorous examples to illustrate 
philosophical points. 
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